ISW

Russian forces continue to conduct meaningless offensive operations around Donetsk City and Bakhmut instead of focusing on defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives that continue to advance. Russian troops continue to attack Bakhmut and various villages near Donetsk City of emotional significance to pro-war residents of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) but little other importance. The Russians are apparently directing some of the very limited reserves available in Ukraine to these efforts rather than to the vulnerable Russian defensive lines hastily thrown up along the Oskil River in eastern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russians cannot hope to make gains around Bakhmut or Donetsk City on a large enough scale to derail Ukrainian counteroffensives and appear to be continuing an almost robotic effort to gain ground in Donetsk Oblast that seems increasingly divorced from the overall realities of the theater. 

Russian failures to rush large-scale reinforcements to eastern Kharkiv and to Luhansk Oblasts leave most of Russian-occupied northeastern Ukraine highly vulnerable to continuing Ukrainian counter-offensives. The Russians may have decided not to defend this area, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s repeated declarations that the purpose of the “special military operation” is to “liberate” Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Prioritizing the defense of Russian gains in southern Ukraine over holding northeastern Ukraine makes strategic sense since Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts are critical terrain for both Russia and Ukraine whereas the sparsely-populated agricultural areas in the northeast are much less so. But the continued Russian offensive operations around Bakhmut and Donetsk City, which are using some of Russia’s very limited effective combat power at the expense of defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives, might indicate that Russian theater decision-making remains questionable.

Ukrainian forces appear to be expanding positions east of the Oskil River and north of the Siverskyi Donets River that could allow them to envelop Russian troops holding around Lyman. Further Ukrainian advances east along the north bank of the Siverskyi Donets River could make Russian positions around Lyman untenable and open the approaches to Lysychansk and ultimately Severodonetsk. The Russian defenders in Lyman still appear to consist in large part of BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) reservists and the remnants of units badly damaged in the Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive, and the Russians do not appear to be directing reinforcements from elsewhere in the theater to these areas.

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continue to prioritize strategically meaningless offensive operations around Donetsk City and Bakhmut over defending against continued Ukrainian counter-offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces liberated a settlement southwest of Lyman and are likely continuing to expand their positions in the area.
• Ukrainian forces continued to conduct an interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces continued to conduct unsuccessful assaults around Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
• Ukrainian sources reported extensive partisan attacks on Russian military assets and logistics in southern Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian officials continued to undertake crypto-mobilization measures to generate forces for war Russian war efforts.
• Russian authorities are working to place 125 “orphan” Ukrainian children from occupied Donetsk Oblast with Russian families.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories) 

Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line) 

Ukrainian and Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian forces are continuing to establish positions northwest and southwest of Lyman on September 17, while Russian forces have maintained their positions in Lyman and Yampil.[1] Geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces raising a flag over Shchurove, situated on the eastern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River six kilometers southwest of Lyman.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces crossed the Siverskyi Donets River and reached Studenok (approximately 25km northwest of Lyman) after Russian forces withdrew from the settlement on September 15.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces shelled Oleksandrivka, which could indicate that Ukrainian forces advanced eight kilometers from Studenok.[4] Russian milbloggers also noted heavy fighting in Oleksandrivka and settlements northwest of Oleksandrivka.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Russian forces fired artillery at Yarova (10km southeast of Studenok), while milbloggers noted fighting in the settlement, likely indicating a Ukrainian advance in the area.[6] Russian sources also claimed active combat in Dobrysheve, between liberated Shchurove and contested Yarova.

Ukrainian and Russian sources also reported kinetic activity on the northern segment of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff and the Russian Defense Ministry reported that Russian forces are shelling Dvorichna (about 17km northeast of Kupyansk), while milbloggers speculated that Ukrainian forces are preparing for an eastward counterattack from the settlement.[8] Geolocated footage showed Ukrainian artillery fire on Russian military equipment operating on the eastern bank of the Oskil River, approximately 38 northeast of Izyum.[9] 

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast) 

Ukrainian military officials maintained their operational silence regarding the progress of the counteroffensive on September 17 but noted the continuation of the Ukrainian interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces struck an alternative Russian pontoon crossing near Sadove (approximately 17km east of Kherson City), an electronic warfare (EW) station in Nova Kakhovka, and a Russian concentration area in Stara Zburyivka (about 23km southwest of Kherson City).[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are preparing retreat routes, including a new crossing in the area of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, due to Ukrainian strikes on Russian crossings over the Dnipro River.[11] Ukrainian military officials noted that the Ukrainian strike on Kherson City on September 10 resulted in the deaths of over 180 Russian servicemen.[12] Social media footage corroborates Ukrainian official statements about the continuation of the interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast. Residents reported smoke and explosions in Antonivka (on the left bank of the Dnipro River) and in Nova Kakhovka.[13] 

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported kinetic activity in three main areas: northwest of Kherson City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border near Vysokopillya. The Russian Defense Ministry and Russian milbloogers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian “large-scale” attack on Pravdyne (approximately 28km northwest of Kherson City) on September 16.[14] Some milbloggers specified that Ukrainian forces advanced through Russian defenses Pravdyne with up to two reinforced companies (likely less than a battalion in strength), which is hardly a large-scale attack.[15] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command also reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to attack Stepova Dolyna (the next settlement north of Pravdyne) from Pravdyne.[16] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are using helicopters to transfer troops to Sukhyi Stavok (about 12km southeast of the bridgehead), which if true, likely indicates the reduced capacity of Russian air defenses in the area.[17] Ukrainian and Russian forces noted that Russian forces continued to shell and launch airstrikes on Sukhyi Stavok.[18] Geolocated footage also showed Ukrainian forces firing at Russian positions in Davydiv Brid.[19] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that a Russian reconnaissance and sabotage group attempted a failed advance on Ukrainian-controlled Novovoznesenske (8km southeast of Vysokopillya) and conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in the direction of Arhanhelske-Ivanivka along the Inhulets RIver.[20] 

Russian forces are intensifying filtration and social control measures in Kherson Oblast as a result of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the region. A local Kherson Oblast Telegram channel reported that Russian forces are conducting filtration measures on Chaykovskiy Street in Kherson City.[21] Russian Telegram channels published footage of Russian servicemen firing at unspecified targets near the Kherson City railway terminal, claiming that Russian forces were conducting a “counterterrorist operation.”[22] 

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued operations and allocating reinforcements to offensive actions aimed at taking relatively small settlements in Donetsk Oblast rather than dedicating these forces to defending against ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensives. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks and continued routine fire throughout Donetsk Oblast on September 17.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground assaults on and south of Bakhmut, on and west of Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.[24] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made incremental advances into the eastern and southern outskirts of Bakhmut.[25] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian ground attack on Berestove, 15km northeast of Soledar on the T1302.[26] Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on September 17 that Russian forces transported a column of 15 Russian tanks marked with the 3rd Army Corps symbol from Mariupol towards Donetsk City, likely to reinforce Russian positions along the Bakhmut-Donetsk City front line.[27]

Russian forces continued striking Ukrainian infrastructure facilities on September 17. Russian forces fired on the Slovyansk Thermal Power Plant, causing a fire and damaging the facility.[28] Ukrainian authorities also stated that Russian shelling of Mykolaivka interrupted the settlement’s water supply.[29]

Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) authorities and other Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of striking government buildings in the Donetsk City center on September 17.[30] DNR Territorial Defense Headquarters claimed that Ukrainian forces fired six 155mm NATO artillery rounds at an administration building, the Ministry of Justice building, and the Central Post Office, killing four and injuring eight civilians.[31]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not conduct any ground attacks and continued routine fire in Zaporizhia Oblast west of Hulyaipole on September 17.[32] Russian sources stated that Russian forces struck unspecified infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City, likely as part of a continued effort to target Ukrainian infrastructure.[33] Ukrainian authorities reported that Russian forces shelled Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast (less than 10km from the Kinburn Spit in Kherson Oblast), throughout the night on September 16-17 and morning on September 17, and conducted air or missile strikes on the settlement during the day on September 17.[34]

Ukrainian sources reported extensive partisan attacks on Russian military assets and logistics in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 17. Ukraine’s Resistance Center reported that (likely partisans) detonated explosives at the Nyzyany rail station (40km east of Tokmak), damaging rail lines on which Russian forces frequently transport military equipment and supplies from occupied Crimea.[35] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the Nyzyany rail station with artillery, rockets, or HIMARS, but the high level of documented partisan activity and the inconsistent Russian narrative suggests that Ukrainian partisans likely conducted the attack.[36] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported explosions (from likely partisan activity) in Bohatyr and Radivonivka (on the southwestern outskirts of Melitopol), where Fedorov reported that Russian forces have established a military base and are storing military equipment.[37] Russian occupation authorities claimed that “terrorists” (likely Ukrainian partisans) blew up power lines in southern Melitopol, damaging concrete supports on the M18/E105 highway connecting Melitopol to Crimea.[38]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced on September 17 that Ukrainian authorities reconnected the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to the Ukrainian power grid following repairs to the main external power lines on September 16.[39] Ukrainian state nuclear agency Energoatom announced on September 16 that a large convoy containing spare parts, chemical reagents, and diesel fuel traveled through Russian checkpoints and arrived at the ZNPP on September 16 that enabled Energoatom engineers to conduct the repairs necessary to reconnect the ZNPP to the Ukrainian power grid.[40] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Ukrainian forces “resumed provocations” by shelling the area around the ZNPP on September 17 but provided no evidence of the claimed shelling.[41] Russian forces continued routine strikes against areas on the north bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir opposite Enerhodar.[42]

Surse ruse și separatiste

*am eliminat comunicatele Minsiterului Apărării – cuprindeau aproape exclusiv date asupra bombardamentelor ruse și prea puțin luptelor în teren. Am păstrat și voi utiliza doar analizele și rapoartele Boris Rhojin și Rybar (Rybar este o platformă de știri de război pe Telegram) pe care le consider cele mai bune canale de informații din sfera milblogerilor ruși.

Boris Rhojin

pe tema construcției de drone ruse.
1. Principala problemă nu este că avem drone proaste, o serie de modele mai mult decât competitive - Orlan, mașini de la ZALA etc. Principala problemă este că sunt complet insuficiente pentru un teatru de operații atât de uriaș. Natura NMD a fost cea care a evidențiat atât de clar problema principală, care ar putea părea mai puțin evidentă în teatrele mai locale, precum cel sirian, unde numărul insuficient de UAV-uri pe kilometru de front a fost compensat de slăbiciunea relativă a inamicului. În teatrul de operațiuni ucrainean, numărul limitat existent de drone pur și simplu se dizolvă într-un spațiu vast.
2. De fapt, răspunsul la întrebarea dacă totul este în regulă la noi cu dronele a fost dat atunci de viceprim-ministrul Borisov, care a rezumat că înainte de război nu am acordat atenția cuvenită construcției de drone, recunoscând neajunsuri obiective. Acest lucru cu siguranță nu anulează realizările birourilor noastre de proiectare, care au creat modele excelente de mașini, dar lasă problema deficiențelor producției lor industriale.

3. Problema cu nișa goală a quadrocopterelor interne, care este acum la cheremul chinezilor (care, datorită publicității gratuite din partea voluntarilor și a armatei, de fapt monopolizat această piață în Rusia) este destul de evident. De fapt, necesită crearea unei producții proprii de loturi la scară largă de astfel de drone. Dacă înainte de SVO acest lucru încă putea părea neevident pentru cineva, acum este clar pentru un copil. Aceasta nu este doar o chestiune de asigurare a unui front, ci și de controlul pieței proprii.

4. În consecință, principala problemă în acest moment nu este că „dronele noastre sunt rahat, totul a dispărut”, ci că volumele de producție ale liniei existente de mașini sunt încă sunt insuficiente și aici sunt necesare eforturi serioase pentru a crește producția a ceea ce avem acum. Dacă capacitățile de producție sunt limitate, este necesară intensificarea achiziției a ceea ce este necesar în străinătate (aici vedem progrese - nu există probleme cu achiziționarea de quadrocoptere chinezești acum, dronele iraniene sunt deja în activitate)
Acest lucru nu elimină nevoia de a îmbunătăți vehiculele existente și de a crea UAV-uri promițătoare (inclusiv roiuri), al căror rol în războaiele din mijlocul celei de-a doua jumătate a anilor 20 va fi foarte semnificativ.

Rybar

Andreevsky
▪️Comandamentul ucrainean al unui elicopter de transport a dislocat un alt grup de militari ai Forțelor Armate ale Ucrainei în zona Sukhoi Stavka.
▪️Artileria rusă și MLRS, precum și avioanele bombardiere, continuă să efectueze foc puternic asupra zonei ocupate de Forțele Armate ale Ucrainei în „intestin”. Formațiunile ucrainene suferă zilnic pierderi grele.
▪️În ciuda declarațiilor comandamentului Forțelor Armate ale Ucrainei despre succesele din sud, numărul pierderilor este incomparabil cu rezultatele. Acest lucru se remarcă în scăderea numărului de forță de muncă trimisă la sacrificare pentru a menține liniile defensive pe malul stâng al Ingulets.
▪️Unitățile Forțelor Armate ale Ucrainei construiesc fortărețe la stația Bereznegovatoe și stabilesc comunicarea cu așezarea. Forțele de inginerie încearcă să restabilească traversările de pontoane prin Ingulets la sud de așezare, pierdute din cauza creșterii nivelului apei în râu.
Soledar
▪️ Detașamentele „PMC Wagner” au ocupat teritoriul substației electrice „Donbasskaya” la sud de Bakhmut (Artemovsk). Acest lucru deschide calea pentru o nouă ofensivă către așezare. Valea Veselă.
▪️În Bakhmut însuși, potrivit canalului Telegram „Brussels Informer” @brussinf, „Wagneriții” au avansat de-a lungul străzii Patrice Lumumba și s-au înrădăcinat la periferia cooperativei dacha
🔻 Direcția Bakhmut (Artemovsk):
▪️Conform unor rapoarte, detașamentele de asalt Wagner PMC au reușit să avanseze în estul lui Bakhmut (Artemovsk) de-a lungul străzii Patrice Lumumba și s-au înrădăcinat în cooperativa locală de dacha.
▪️La sud de Bakhmut, wagneriții au reușit să ocupe stația electrică Donbasskaya, ceea ce deschide calea pentru o nouă ofensivă către Veselaia Dolina.
🔻Direcția Donețk:
▪️Forțele ucrainene au efectuat din nou un bombardament masiv în Donețk. În urma atacurilor asupra cartierului Voroshilovsky al orașului, cel puțin 2 civili au fost uciși.
▪️Forțele Armate ale Ucrainei fac încercări de a contraataca pozițiile „PMC Wagner” pe aproape întreaga linie de contact la sud și est de Bakhmut, bombardând non-stop satele Klinovye și Pokrovskoye. Cu toate acestea, „wagneriții” continuă să dețină teritoriile ocupate anterior.
▪️ Bătăliile de poziție continuă în Soledar.
▪️Forțele Aerospațiale Ruse au efectuat lovituri aeriene asupra țintelor din Seversk.
▪️Forțele aliate au tras în pozițiile Forțelor Armate ale Ucrainei din Zakotny, New York, Dronovka, Verkhnekamensky, Sosnovoe, Razdolovka, Vyemka, Otradovka, Soledar, Bakhmutsky, Yakovlevka, Vesela Dolina și Veseloe.
Donbass: 
🔻Teritorii de frontieră ale Federației Ruse:
▪️ După-amiază, formațiuni ucrainene au bombardat satul Krasny Khutor din regiunea Belgorod, o femeie a murit, mai multe persoane au fost rănite.
🔻Direcția Kharkiv:
▪️Forțele aliate au lucrat pe pozițiile inamice din Zolochev, Kudievka, Goptovka, Gorokhovatka, Razdolny și Strelechya.
▪️Forțele Armate ale RF au lansat lovituri cu rachete asupra facilităților Forțelor Armate ale Ucrainei din districtele Kievsky și Sloboda din Harkov, precum și în districtul Chuguevsky din regiune.
🔻Direcția Slaviansko-Barvenkovskoe:
▪️La râul Oskol, Forțele Armate RF duc lupte grele în apropierea satului Rubtsy. Formațiunile ucrainene aruncă periodic DRG-uri pe teritoriul controlat de ruși în încercarea de a ajunge la Borovoye. Scopul Forțelor Armate ale Ucrainei este să ajungă în spatele grupului rus în grupuri mici pentru a le separa de liniile principale de aprovizionare.
▪️Inamicul nu lasă încercări de a forța Oskol lângă Kupyansk pentru a obține un punct de sprijin pentru un nou atac asupra orașului.
🔻Directia Zaporozhye:
▪️Formațiunile ucrainene au continuat să bombardeze teritoriul centralei nucleare Zaporojie. Ca răspuns, forțele armate ale RF au atacat punctele de tragere inamice din Nikopol, Marganets și Vyshetarasovka.