Război în Ucraina. Update – ziua 207, 18.09.2022

ISW

Key Takeaways

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be increasingly relying on irregular, poorly trained ad-hoc volunteer and proxy units rather than attempting to rebuild damaged or destroyed conventional Russian ground forces units.
  • Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate positions on the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast despite Russian efforts to contain them.
  • Russian forces in western Kherson Oblast may be attempting to fall back to more defensible positions in a controlled withdrawal to avoid the chaotic retreat that characterized the collapse of Russian defenses in Kharkiv earlier in September.
  • Russian forces suffered devastating losses of manpower and equipment in their fight for eastern Ukraine and especially during the Ukrainian Kharkiv counter-offensive. Multiple Russian armored and mechanized units have likely been effectively destroyed according to assessments released on September 18.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line)

Ukrainian forces are continuing to establish positions on the east bank of the Oskil River. A Russian source reported that fighting is ongoing in eastern Kupyansk, indicating that Ukrainian forces are consolidating prior gains.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground assault on Kupyansk.[15] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai posted footage of Ukrainian personnel driving a tank over a pontoon bridge at an unspecified location and claimed that Ukrainian forces control an unspecified location on the east bank of the river.[16] Footage posted on September 17 shows Ukrainian forces operating on the Oskil River in a boat and receiving Russian artillery fire before advancing to the east bank.[17]

A Ukrainian official stated that Ukrainian forces are waiting for the fall of Lyman before beginning ground operations to retake Luhansk Oblast.[18] Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Russian logistics node at Svatove, Luhansk Oblast on September 18. The Luhansk People’s Republic Interior Ministry claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a hotel and bus stop with two HIMARS rounds.[19] Ukrainian forces have likely previously struck Russian military targets in Svatove, likely impeding the Russian ability to defend Svatove and other areas in the rear if Ukrainian forces choose to advance.[20] Svatove has served as a hub on the Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Severodonetsk. Haidai noted that Russian forces are establishing fortifications in areas close to the front lines, including Svatove, Troitske, Rubizhne, and Popasna.[21] Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas undermine these efforts and will degrade Russian forces’ ability to defend these areas if Ukraine advances. These positions are not close to one another, moreover, and Russian forces in this area may be challenged to form coherent defensive lines across such a wide area.

Russian forces continued to strike border areas along the Kharkiv-Belgorod Oblast border and conducted a limited ground assault north of Kharkiv City.[22] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground assault on Hoptivka, less than two kilometers from the international border.[23]

Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces are “conceding” and losing tactically significant positions in unspecified areas in Kherson Oblast.[24] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command added that Russian forces have decreased the intensity of their artillery fire over some unspecified segments along the line of contact.[25] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command noted that platoon-sized Russian elements still unsuccessfully attempt to assault Ukrainian positions in unspecified areas, however.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces are coercing civilians to fortify Russian positions in Chonhar on the eastern Kherson Oblast-Crimean border, which may indicate that Russian forces are setting up defenses in anticipation of Ukrainian counteroffensives south of the Dnipro River.[27] Ukrainian military officials added that Russian forces continued to evict civilians from their homes west of Kherson City and in northern Kherson Oblast and are increasingly searching for deserters in the region.[28]

Ukrainian military officials and local reports note that Ukrainian forces are continuing their interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian barge that was delivering military equipment and ammunition, resulting in the deaths of 62 Russian servicemen and destruction of at least five armored vehicles according to preliminary information.[29] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command added that Ukrainian strikes undermined Russian efforts to repair the Antonivsky Railway Bridge.[30] Ukrainian military officials also reported the destruction of a Russian ammunition depot in Blahodatne, although it is unclear if they referred to the Blahodatne settlement in Mykolaiv Oblast or Kherson Oblast.[31] Social media users also reported that Russian air defenses activated in Nova Kakhovka at least 10 minutes after a missile struck an unspecified target in Nova Kakhovka.[32] Residents published footage of plumes of smoke in Yubileyne, Oleshky Raion (about 51km southeast of Kherson City), and the Ukrainian Southern Operational Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk noted explosions in Oleshky but did not specify their cause.[33]  Local Telegram channels also published footage from around Beryslav in northern Kherson Oblast, noting that Russian forces have been extinguishing the fire for more than two hours.[34]

Ukrainian officials denied the involvement of Ukrainian forces in a street shooting in downtown Kherson City on the night of September 17 and September 18.[35] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command claimed that the shooting was a Russian provocation.[36] Humenyuk noted that Ukrainian security services have previously warned civilians of possible Russian provocations in populated areas between September 17 and September 20 and claimed that the shooting in Kherson City is a Russian attempt to discredit Ukrainian forces.[37] Advisor to the head of the Ukrainian President’s Office Mykhailo Podolyak noted that Russian street fights indicate that there are boiling tensions between the personnel of private military companies, Russian Armed Forces, Chechen units, and elements of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) amidst the pressure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[38] Advisor to the Kherson Oblast Military Administration Serhiy Khlan suggested that the incident was “a cheap spectacle,” and noted that Russian occupation authorities are seeking to create a propaganda narrative that Russian forces are able to maintain control of the city.[39] Russian proxy authorities denied the involvement of Ukrainian sabotage groups and did not provide any additional details.[40] The initial Russian proxy denial makes the assessment that that incident was part of an information operation to discredit Ukrainian forces less likely.  The incident may instead indicate that Russian forces are struggling to retain control of the city, possibly because of the infighting Podolyak suggests is prevalent.

Ukrainian and Russian sources identified three areas of kinetic activity on September 18: northwest of Kherson City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border near Vysokopillya. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Pravdyne (about 30km northwest of Kherson City), and geolocated footage showed Ukrainian artillery striking Russian forces near the settlement.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian and Russian troops continued to fight in Bezimenne (approximately 12km southeast of the bridgehead), and increasingly commented on the effects of the flood caused by Russian damage to dams on the Inhulets River on Ukrainian logistics.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces fired artillery at Ukrainka and launched airstrikes at Bilyaivka, both southeast of Vysokopillya within Russian assessed territory.[43] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed striking Ukrainian positions in Veremiivka, just north of Ukrainka and Bilyaivka.[44]

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and Avdiivka and continued routine artillery fire along the Donetsk Oblast front line on September 18.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces suffered significant losses when attempting an assault in the Avdiivka direction and that medical facilities admit more than 30 Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 1st Army Corps servicemen daily.[46] Russian forces shelled the Slovyansk Thermal Power Plant again on September 18, severely damaging an administrative building.[47] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Zaitseve in the direction of Chasiv Yar to the west.[48]

A kinetic event reportedly killed one Ukrainian POW and wounded five others in the Russian-occupied Olenivka penal colony, Donetsk Oblast, on September 18. The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) accused Ukrainian forces of shelling the penal colony on September 18.[49] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the penal colony with Uragan multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).[50] Ukrainian Parliamentary Representative for Human Rights Dmytro Lyubinets did not confirm whether the kinetic event occurred but stated that there is no information on casualties and that it is unclear why Russia would shell Olenivka.[51] Western outlets assessed that Russian forces had likely conducted a previous strike on the Olenivka penal colony that killed at least 53 Ukrainian POWs and injured dozens more on July 29.[52] Russian authorities may use an additional attack on the Olenivka penal colony to justify delaying the UN fact-finding mission tasked with investigating the July 29 attack.[53]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not conduct any ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast and continued routine fire along the front lines in Zaporizhia and Mykolaiv Oblasts on September 18.[54] Russian forces heavily shelled Ochakiv, less than 10km from the Kinburn Spit in Kherson Oblast, overnight on September 17-18 and during the morning on September 18.[55] Russian forces continued routine fire against areas on the north bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir opposite Enerhodar.[56]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian rear areas in Zaporizhia Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Kamyanka (roughly 25km east of Tokmak) with HIMARS.[57] Rogov also claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Bilmak (roughly 70km north of Berdyansk) and posted footage of a severely damaged hangar.[58] A Russian source reported many explosions in Melitopol but did not specify the cause or number.

Surse ruse și separatiste

Ministerul Apărării al Federației Ruse

▪️În direcția Nikolaev-Kryvyi Rih, inamicul, cu ajutorul a trei grupuri tactice de companie ale Brigăziilor 60 Infanterie și 57 Infanterie Motorizată, sprijinite de șase tancuri, a făcut încercări ofensive nereușite în zonele MIROLYUBOVKA, MALA SEYDEMINUKHA și BELOGORKA. regiunea Herson. Toate atacurile au fost respinse cu succes de unitățile forțelor armate ruse.
▪️Armele de înaltă precizie ale Forțelor Aerospațiale Ruse din apropierea orașului Nikolaev au lovit personalul și echipamentele militare ale unităților brigăzilor 28 mecanizate și 79 de asalt aerian ale Forțelor Armate ale Ucrainei. În ziua ostilităților în această direcție, pierderile trupelor ucrainene s-au ridicat la peste 180 de militari, 2 tancuri, 7 vehicule blindate de luptă, 3 tunuri și 10 vehicule.
▪️Ca urmare a loviturilor asupra pozițiilor brigăzilor 54, 93 mecanizate și brigăzii 10 de asalt montan a Forțelor Armate ale Ucrainei în zonele așezărilor VERHNEKAMENSKOE, SPORNOYE, BERESTOVOE, ARTYOMOVSK și ZAYTSEVO Republicii Populare Donetsk pierderile inamicului s-au ridicat la peste 110 militari și 20 de unități de echipament militar.
▪️Lovituri de înaltă precizie ale Forțelor Aerospațiale Ruse pe locurile de concentrare a forței de muncă și a echipamentelor militare ale unităților brigăzii 14 mecanizate din zonele așezărilor KOCHETOK, ROHAN, DOROSHENKOVO, VELIKA BABKA și CHUGUEV din regiunea Harkov, Brigada 63 mecanizată din zona VEREMIEVKA, precum și cea de-a 3-a dintr-un batalion de apărare teritorial separat din zona MIROLYUBOVKA din regiunea Herson, au fost distruse peste 150 de militari ucraineni și 17 unități de echipament militar blindat și special.
🔻În total, de la începutul operațiunii militare speciale, 293 avioane, 155 elicoptere, 1981 vehicule aeriene fără pilot, 375 sisteme de rachete antiaeriene, 5022 tancuri și alte vehicule blindate de luptă, 837 vehicule de luptă cu sisteme de lansare multiplă de rachete, 3397 de câmp tunuri și mortiere de artilerie, precum și 5680 de unități de vehicule militare speciale

Analiză Rybar: Vor fi abandonate Kherson și Zaporojie?

🔻Motive obiective pentru care nu este planificată închirierea regiunilor.
▪️Bani
O campanie la scară largă este în desfășurare pentru a privatiza atât proprietatea de stat, cât și proprietatea privată a oamenilor de afaceri ucraineni care nu se grăbesc să intre în teritoriile controlate de Rusia. Sunt licitate licitații pentru restaurarea așezărilor și a infrastructurii. Nici măcar o zecime din sumele care sunt acum alocate în sud nu au fost cheltuite pe proiecte din regiunea Harkov.
▪️Saturarea regiunii cu trupe
Formațiunile de voluntari, care fac parte din Corpul 3 Armată, întăresc deja unitățile din liniile de detenție ale Forțelor Armate RF. Da, nu există suficiente forțe pentru a desfășura o ofensivă pe un front larg. Însă față de ceea ce era imaginea în zone în urmă cu o lună și jumătate, densitatea concentrației de trupe în anumite zone a crescut de trei-patru ori.
În plus, procesul de formare și recrutare a Corpului 4 Armată a început deja. Cel puțin pe hârtie.
▪️ „Nici un pas înapoi”
Săptămâna trecută, toate unitățile din Donbass și din sud au trecut comanda „Nici un pas înapoi”. S-a ordonat păstrarea liniilor ocupate cu orice preț. Rămâne de sperat că acum sarcina principală este reducerea potențialului ofensiv al Forțelor Armate ale Ucrainei și încercarea de a prelua inițiativa.
Unitățile civile, da, au primit instrucțiuni în caz de evacuare forțată. Dar aceasta este o practică normală: din păcate, în regiunea Harkov, totul a ieșit prost.
🔻Motive obiective pentru care regiunile sunt încă în pericol.
▪️Superioritatea numerică a Forțelor Armate ale Ucrainei și potențialul de șoc al Occidentului
Din păcate, în Ucraina își permit să umple formațiunile defensive ale Forțelor Armate RF cu „carne” mobilizată, indiferent de pierderi. Dacă aceasta este înmulțită de canalele practic nelimitate pentru aprovizionarea cu arme, echipamente și muniție, putem ajunge la o concluzie simplă: există un război de anihilare. Și, de asemenea, saturația complexului militar-industrial occidental cu comenzi pentru deceniile următoare.
Pentru cealaltă parte, tot ceea ce se întâmplă este o șansă de a câștiga bani în război. Și, din păcate, dacă nu se iau măsuri mai radicale pentru a mobiliza producția, economia și trupele din Rusia, s-ar putea să fim la un moment dat copleșiți de această „carne”.
▪️Subiectul licitației
Teritoriile-tampon eliberate, oricât de cinic ar suna, pot rămâne subiectul negocierilor pentru politicieni. Singura întrebare este cât de mare va fi miza atunci când una dintre părți dorește să „repare” starea de lucruri și să înghețe frontul pentru o nouă descoperire.
🔻Nu va exista nicio ieșire.
Lăsați fiecare să o facă singur. Credem în cei mai buni. Și știm că anumite schimbări tectonice au început după Harkov. Oficialii au fost trași la răspundere.
Multe rapoarte rămân încă „o fabulă despre cât de bun este totul”. Dar sunt tot mai multe cazuri în care, acolo sus, se confruntă cu realitatea obiectivă. Și încep schimbările.

Boris Rhojin

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